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Given the limited capacity of working memory (WM), its resources should be allocated
strategically. One strategy is filtering, whereby access to WM is granted preferentially to
items with the greatest utility. However, reallocation of WM resources might be required if
the utility of maintained information subsequently declines. Here, we present behavioral,
computational, and neuroimaging evidence that human participants track changes in the
predicted utility of information in WM. First, participants demonstrated behavioral costs
when the utility of items already maintained in WM declined and resources should be
reallocated. An adapted Q-learning model indicated that these costs scaled with the
historical utility of individual items. Finally, model-based neuroimaging demonstrated that
frontal cortex tracked the utility of items to be maintained in WM, whereas ventral striatum
tracked changes in the utility of items maintained in WM to the degree that these items
are no longer useful. Our findings suggest that frontostriatal mechanisms track the utility
of information in WM, and that these dynamics may predict delays in the removal of
information from WM.
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INTRODUCTION
Working memory (WM) capacity is limited to as few as 3 or
4 items (Cowan, 2001). Nevertheless, this shallow resource is
sufficient to support a wide array of domain-general intellec-
tual abilities (Conway et al., 2003; Ackerman et al., 2005; Cowan
et al., 2005; Oberauer, 2005; Kane et al., 2007; Fukuda et al.,
2010). Thus, higher cognition requires control systems that can
strategically manage our limited WM capacity.
Prior work has identified two key operations that may help
to support strategic allocation of WM resources. First, selec-
tive updating (i.e., “filtering”) of WM permits only task-relevant
information to consume resources (Peers et al., 2005; Vogel et al.,
2005; McNab and Klingberg, 2008; Jost et al., 2011). Selective
WM updating is thought to rely on striatally-mediated rein-
forcement learning (RL) systems to identify reward-predictive
information in the environment, which then allow only that
information into frontally-mediated WM (Braver and Cohen,
2000; Frank et al., 2001; Gruber et al., 2006; McNab and
Klingberg, 2008).
Second, a mechanism is required to reallocate WM resources
as circumstances change. Consider that information initially
judged relevant, and so updated into WM, might later
become obsolete or be revealed as entirely irrelevant. Under
such conditions, rather than permitting this item to fur-
ther occupy WM resources, it is adaptive to reallocate WM
resources. Much evidence suggests that people can reallo-
cate WM, albeit often sluggishly (on the order of 1–3 s;
Oberauer, 2001, 2003, 2005; see also Hasher and Zacks,
1988; Cooper et al., 1996; Hasher et al., 1999; Conway
et al., 2003; Cansino et al., 2013; LaRocque et al., 2013).
However, relatively little is known about the computational
or neurobiological underpinnings of this putative reallocation
process.
Both WM updating and WM reallocation could rely on a sys-
tem for tracking utility. As already noted, WM updating may be
supported by RL mechanisms that track the predicted utility of
newly-observed information in the world, given somemaintained
context. Similarly,WM reallocation processes might be supported
by RL mechanisms that track the predicted utility of information
inWM, given some newly-observed context. Put another way, just
as WM updating requires monitoring changes in the utility of
information encountered in the environment, WM reallocation
could rely on striatally-mediated systems that monitor changes in
the utility of information currently maintained in WM. However,
there is as yet no evidence that RL plays such a role during WM
reallocation.
Here we test the potential role of frontostriatal RL mecha-
nisms during WM reallocation using a novel task. In this task,
a disambiguating context was occasionally presented following
the storage of a single item in WM. This context, by virtue
of an instructed hierarchical rule (Figure 1A), either decreased
(Figure 1B), increased (Figure 1C, left), or left mostly unchanged
(Figure 1C, right) the predicted utility of the previously-
maintained item. After the context was presented, responses were
provided to a subsequent item following a variable interstim-
ulus interval (ISI), thereby allowing us to investigate the time
course of any behavioral benefits arising from the putative real-
location of WM. Due to the randomized nature of the design,
each trial varied in terms of the utility of information in WM
following the presentation of the context. Together, these fea-
tures allowed us to (a) separately assess the behavioral effects of
increases and decreases in the utility of information in WM, (b)
capture learning on the basis of these changes in an RL model,
and (c) correlate these model-based estimates with the BOLD
response while participants performed an fMRI-adapted version
of the same task.
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FIGURE 1 | Task rules (A), theinterstimulus interval manipulation (B),
and control conditions (C). (A) In this sequential WM task, participants are
instructed that digits serve as context in determining which class of
lower-level items will be relevant for selecting a response. For example, if the
digit “1”/“2” appears, wingdings/letters are relevant for responses
(respectively), whereas if the digit “3” appears both of the lower-level items
will be relevant. Participants are to identify the relevant centrally-presented
item(s) from each trial at the bottom of the final stimulus display, and press a
corresponding key. (B) In the ICR condition, an irrelevant item precedes the
context. With a “short” ISI, this irrelevant item may increase the effective
WM load; following a longer ISI, the influence of this irrelevant item may be
reduced. (C) In the RCI control condition, the relevant lower-level item is
presented prior to the digit, so participants must merely identify the location
of that relevant stimulus at the bottom of the final stimulus display; by
contrast, in the RCR control condition, participants may experience a higher
effective WM load because both items are relevant for a response.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-two right handed adults (aged 18–35; 8 female) with nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision completed the experiment. All
participants were native English speakers and had been screened
for the use of psychiatric and neurological medications and con-
ditions, as well as for contraindications for MRI. All participants
provided informed consent in accordance with the Research
Protections Office at Brown University.
BASIC TASK DESIGN (BEHAVIORAL)
Each trial consisted of the sequential presentation of a digit (either
1, 2, or 3), a letter (either A or B), and a symbol (the wingdings
and ). Participants used these tokens to select a left or right key
press response based on a hierarchical rule that they were pro-
vided at the outset of the experiment (Figure 1A). Specifically,
participants were instructed that the digit “1” specified that only
the wingding appearing on that trial would be useful for select-
ing the appropriate response; that the digit “2” specified that only
the letter appearing on that trial would be useful for selecting the
appropriate response; and that the digit “3” specified that both
the letter and wingding appearing on that trial would be useful
for selecting a response. Participants selected a response by iden-
tifying whether the relevant item (i.e., letter, wingding, or both)
appeared on the bottom left or bottom right of the final stimulus
event, and pressed the corresponding left or right key. There was
always one, and only one, correct answer. In other words, one and
only one side of the final stimulus event always contained both
lower-level items from any trial involving the digit “3”, or the rel-
evant lower-level item from any trial involving the other digits.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately
as possible upon presentation of the mappings.
Across 180 trials in the experiment, the tokens of each type
(letter, symbol, or number) were equiprobable, but appeared in
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random orders for 500ms each and with a variable ISI for all
stimulus events (1.5–5 s). (Note: The distribution of ISIs was pos-
itively skewed to strike a balance between a short task completion
time, and our desire to emulate the ISIs that would subsequently
be experienced in the scanner.) The randomized presentation
complicates the task because digits acting as a higher-level con-
text sometimes occur after lower-level items have already been
updated into WM, taxing reallocation mechanisms (Figure 1A).
The key task conditions for the present report are as follows.
First, the token presented on the first stimulus event could be
rendered irrelevant by the presentation of the subsequent context
(i.e., an “irrelevant-context-relevant” trial; ICR; Figure 1B). For
example, if a letter was presented first and was then followed by
the number “1”, then the letter is irrelevant and the next item (the
wingding) will be relevant. Alternatively, the token presented on
the first stimulus event could be rendered relevant, either because
it was of the class of tokens that were selectively relevant under
that context (i.e., a “relevant-context-irrelevant” or RCI trial),
or because it was just one of the two tokens that would be rele-
vant on that trial (i.e., a “relevant-context-relevant” or RCR trial;
Figure 1C). We note that context could appear in any of the three
order positions throughout the task, but we focus on the trials in
which it appears in the middle position here.
TASK DESIGN (fMRI)
Immediately following completion of the behavioral task, partici-
pants were administered the same task in the scanner. The scanner
version of the task differed from the behavioral version in three
ways: first, participants were instructed to respond with the index
and middle fingers of their right hand, as opposed to the index
fingers of their left and right hands, corresponding to the left and
right sides of the response mappings. Second, the response cues
were provided as a separate stimulus event that followed the last
token on each trial by the same variable interval used between all
other stimuli in the scanned version of the experiment (1.5–9.5
s). This delay between the final stimulus event and the response
mappings event would be expected to mask the behavioral effects
indicative of reallocation because they could occur during the
interval itself. Consequently, it was not possible to assess the same
behavioral effects in the scanner, although performance in the
scanner remained comparable to that observed in the behavioral
session (see Results, below) Finally, the task was administered in
4 × 10-min blocks, rather than one continuous block.
Unlike the behavioral version of the experiment, the duration
of each interstimulus and intertrial interval was determined by a
variant of OptSeq2 (Greve, 2002), under the constraint that no
more than 33% of the total time spent in the scanner consisted
of null fixation events, so as to optimize the design for use with
rapid-event related fMRI. Stimulus duration was kept at a con-
stant 500ms. The optimized fMRI design yielded 24, 18, and 25
individual trials for the ICR, RCI, and RCR conditions for each
subject, respectively.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNINGMODEL
The statistics of this task are such that the presentation of con-
text in the ICR and RCI conditions would be expected to decrease
and increase (respectively) the predicted utility of the preceding
item in WM. By contrast, the RCR condition yields less change
in the predicted utility of the preceding item. This approximate
symmetry occurs because, while there is always one and only
one correct response for each trial, 50% of the time the incorrect
response option also involved one item that had been seen on that
trial (a “lure” trial). We formalize these notions in our RL model
such that for each item, i, occurring on a trial, t, the experienced
utility U is determined by the item’s association with the correct
response:
Ut, i =
{
1 if associated with correct response
0 otherwise
(1)
Concretely, an item is considered to be “associated” with the cor-
rect response if that item appeared only on the side of the screen
corresponding to participants’ button press, and that button press
was objectively correct.
For each correct trial the context, c, is also given a utility:
Ut, c =
{
1 if context is necessary to determine correct response
0.5 contextis unnecessary to determine correct response
(2)
Context was considered “unnecessary” to determine the cor-
rect response on non-lure trials, because the same correct
answer would have been selected regardless of which context had
appeared on that trial.
The predicted utility, PU, of each item was updated across tri-
als according to a utility prediction error, scaled by the learning
rate, α:
PUt + 1, i = PUt, i + α
(
Ut, i − PUt, i
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
“UPE”
(3)
The identical equation was applied for determining the predicted
utility of each context, replacing “i” with “c” in the equation
above.
For simplicity, UPE was set to zero for any item or context that
would not presently be in WM at the time of a response, assum-
ing participants followed the instructed rules and were capable of
removing that information from WM; it was also set to zero for
any items and contexts appearing on incorrect trials.
To fit the observed RT for the ICR short ISI condition (see
Equation 4), the most likely learning rate and starting utilities for
items and contexts was found for each participant via a hierar-
chical Bayesian model implemented in JAGS (Just Another Gibbs
Sampler, Plummer, 2004) for R (CRAN Project for Statistical
Computing). In this model, each fitted parameter for each partici-
pant was simulated as a random draw from a normal distribution
characterizing that parameter across population; these hyperpa-
rameters were given flat hyperpriors. 3 chains of Gibbs samples
were burnt-in for 1000 samples, with an additional 10,000 iter-
ations of Gibbs samples used for a posteriori inference. The
posterior means were used as point estimates for each participant.
MRI PROCEDURE
Whole-brain imaging was performed on a Siemens 3 T TIM
Trio MRI system with a 32-channel head coil. A high resolu-
tion T1multi-echoMPRAGEwas collected from each participant.
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Functional images were acquired in four runs, each consisting
of 303 volumes, with a fat-saturated gradient-echo echo-planar
sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 28ms, flip angle = 90◦, 38 interleaved
axial slices, 192mm FOV with voxel size of 3mm3). Head motion
was restricted with padding. Visual stimuli were rear-projected
and viewed with a mirror attached to the head coil. Participants
responded using an MRI-compatible button box.
DATA PREPROCESSING
Behavioral data
The first 10 trials of the behavioral experiment were excluded, as
were any incorrect trials or trials with RTs more than 5 standard
deviations from a participant’s mean RT.
Imaging data
Data were processed using a combination of SPM and FSL.
First, SPM8 tools (artglobal and tsdiffana) were used for arti-
fact detection, and slice timing correction was then performed.
The first six volumes of each run were discarded to allow the
scanner to reach steady state. The data were motion-corrected
using rigid transformations in MCFLIRT to the middle acquisi-
tion of each run. Only one participant moved more than 2mm
within any run, so that one run was excluded from analysis.
Grand-mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset
was performed with a single multiplicative factor, and the data
were subjected to a temporal highpass filter (Gaussian-weighted
least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 32.5 s), and the
data were smoothed at 8mm FWHM. The middle acquisition of
each run was then registered to each participant’s brain-extracted
MPRAGE using a linear 7DOF transform, and the MPRAGE
was registered to the MNI standard brain using a linear 12DOF
transform.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
For behavioral data, accuracy and reaction time on correct trials
for the three conditions (ICR, RCI, and ICR) at each ISI [short
(1.5 s) vs. long (3.5 s)] for each subject were averaged within each
cell of this 3 × 2 design, and subjected to two-tailed tests respect-
ing non-independence in the data (e.g., paired-sample t-tests,
repeated measures ANOVAs, or the equivalent appropriate test).
Too few trials were included at the longest ISI of 5 s to permit
analysis of that cell alone, so those trials were excluded. Where
ANOVA is used, we report single degree-of-freedom F-tests for
the focused contrasts of interest as estimated through orthogo-
nal contrast codes (e.g., Helmert coding; Rosenthal and Rosnow,
1985). Error rates were subject to the variance-stabilizing arc-
sin square root transformation prior to analysis. All error bars
represent ±1 standard error.
For the fMRI analysis, a GLM was estimated using FEAT
(FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) version 5.98 (FMRIB’s Software
Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl), on the basis of explanatory
variables (EVs) coding for the following event types: the selec-
tive contextual cue (i.e., Digits 1 or 2) or the global contextual
cue (i.e., Digit 3) appearing in the first position, middle posi-
tion, or last position; and items appearing in the first or middle
position. Separate EVs were used to capture items appearing in
the last position under the selective context and global contexts
for reasons that are unimportant for the present report. The
duration of each event in all these EVs was set to the stimu-
lus duration (500ms). Separate boxcar EVs were used to capture
responses; the duration of each event in these EVs was set to
the observed RT on each trial. Additional nuisance EVs were
also included in the GLM, including those corresponding to
trials where participants responded incorrectly (although accu-
racy was uniformly above 90% for each condition as performed
within the scanner), and to the 6 degrees of movement estimated
by MCFLIRT. All EVs except those corresponding to movement
were convolved with a standard hemodynamic response func-
tion, high-pass filtered in the same way as the functional data,
and then used as a regressor (including temporal derivatives) in
the GLM.
Where small-volume correction for the basal ganglia is used,
the mask used consisted of the anatomically defined caudate,
nucleus accumbens, putamen, and pallidum, as defined according
to the Harvard-Oxford subcortical atlas.
MODEL-BASED fMRI ANALYSES
The learning rates and predicted utilities for each item and con-
text at the conclusion of the behavioral experiment were used as
the learning rates and predicted utility values for each item and
context for an identical RL model applied to the trials experi-
enced by each participant in the scanner. In other words, the RL
model was fit to data from the behavioral experiment, and the fit-
ted model was then applied to the sequence of trials experienced
by that same subject during the fMRI experiment. The resulting
trial-by-trial predicted utility estimates were used to calculate the
same composite term that correlated with behavior outside the
scanner. Specifically, the composite term was computed using the
expression for predicted utility included in Equation 4, below.
This term was then used as a trial-by-trial parametric regres-
sor, normalized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one
within each run, for the ICR condition. Equivalent terms for the
RCI and RCR conditions were also calculated, and used as trial-
by-trial parametric regressors for comparison purposes. Each
instance of those conditions was modeled as an event onsetting
with the context, lasting 0.5 s in duration, after convolution with
a standard hemodynamic response function (and its temporal
derivative).
RESULTS
OVERALL PERFORMANCE DURING “CONTEXTMIDDLE” CONDITIONS
The present report focuses on the trials during which the dis-
ambiguating context appeared in the middle position, though
participants encountered other orderings during the task, as well
(seeMaterials andMethods). Performance on these “context mid-
dle” events was high overall. Specifically, the mean error rate was
8.9%, with a mean RT of 819ms during the behavioral portion
of the experiment. Although performance remained high during
the scanned version of the task (mean error rate of 8.1%, mean
RT of 803ms), our further behavioral analyses focus entirely on
the behavioral portion of the experiment, where the phenomena
indicative of WM reallocation would not be masked by the longer
ISIs used in the scanned version of the experiment (see Materials
and Methods).
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 83 | 4
Chatham and Badre Utility of working memory
EFFECTS OF ISI ON PERFORMANCE (BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT)
If participants do reallocate WM resources when the predicted
utility of a maintained item suddenly drops (as in the ICR con-
dition; Figure 1B), and such reallocation is time consuming,
then performance should be affected by the amount of time
available for reallocation. Accordingly, we divided the ICR, RCI,
and RCR trials depending on whether a short ISI (1.5 s) or a
long ISI (3.5 s) was provided between the presentation of the
context and the final stimulus event + response mapping. In
this way, we assessed changes in performance as a function of
the time elapsed after the presentation of the disambiguating
context.
Performance differed between the RCI and the RCR condi-
tion comparably across both long and short ISIs. Specifically, the
RCI condition was associated with reduced RT [F(1, 21) = 84.8,
p < 0.001], but somewhat more errors [F(1, 21) = 4.7, p = 0.04],
than the RCR condition, independent of ISI. The difference in
RT across conditions, irrespective of ISI, was not explained by the
difference in accuracy between the conditions (as indicated by a
significant effect of condition [RCR vs. RCI] even after controlling
for the difference in accuracy between the conditions; F(1, 20) =
67.98, p < 0.001), nor was there any correlation between the dif-
ference in RT and the difference in accuracy (PearsonR= 0.0006),
both results arguing against a simple speed-accuracy tradeoff.
As the maintained first position item is useful in both of these
conditions, this disproportionate increase in RT may in part be
attributable to the added WM load from the third position item
in the RCR condition (though other factors may also contribute
to the elevated RT in this condition).
Nonetheless, and consistent with the idea that participants
undertake a time-consuming reallocation process, performance
was differentially improved at the longer ISI in the ICR condi-
tion relative to the other conditions (in terms of the interaction
of ISI with the focused contrast of ICR vs. the other conditions:
F(1, 21) = 3.17, p < 0.09 and F(1, 21) = 9.0, p = 0.007 for errors
and RT, respectively). This interaction was further probed with
focused t-tests, indicating that the longer ISI was associated with
improved performance in the ICR condition [t(21) = 2.62, p <
0.02 and t(21) = 3.56, p = 0.002 for errors and RT, respectively),
but not in the RCI or RCR conditions (t’s< 1.2, p’s> 0.25 and t’s
< 1.4, p’s> 0.15 for errors and RT, respectively). Figure 2 depicts
these effects in terms of errors (A and B) and reaction times (C
and D), both at the level of the group means (A and C) and for
individual subjects (B andD). Thus, these results suggest that at a
short ISI, the lingering effect of the not-yet-removed first position
item produced a higher WM load effect, akin to that which might
contribute to the poorer performance in the RCR condition1. By
1As noted previously, the elevated RT in the RCR condition may not exclu-
sively reflect its increased WM demands. For example, the elevated RT in this
condition could reflect extra demands on the deployment of external atten-
tion during the final stimulus display. Nonetheless, such demands on external
attention are constant across the ISIs of each condition; they thus offer a less
parsimonious explanation than WM load for the full pattern of effects.
FIGURE 2 | Disproportionate benefits as a function of ISI in the ICR
condition in terms of errors (A and B) and reaction times (C and D).
(A) Error rates decreased as a function of ISI in the ICR condition. (B)
The majority of the data fell reliably below the line of identity relating
error rates on the short and long ISI trials in the ICR condition, indicating
a reliable increase in accuracy as a function of ISI in that condition.
[Note: participants with perfect accuracy across both ISIs are not shown
(n = 6)]. (C) As with Errors, RT decreased as a function of ISI in the ICR
condition, relative to the control conditions. (D) Again, the majority of the
data fell below the line of identity relating RT on the short and long ISI
trials in the ICR condition, indicating a reliable decrease in RT as a
function of ISI.
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contrast, with sufficient time, the loss of the first item may reduce
effective WM load, yielding performance that is more comparable
to the RCI condition.
EFFECTS OF RESPONSE LURES ON PERFORMANCE (BEHAVIORAL
EXPERIMENT)
One potential concern is that the aforementioned effects were
due to a differential effect of response lures in the ICR condi-
tion. Specifically, it could be that priming or potentiation of a
recently maintained item at the short ISI made it more difficult
to reject the response that was cued by that irrelevant item. Thus,
the performance declines at the short ISI might arise from this
response competition effect, rather than a load effect. However,
there was no evidence of increased sensitivity to lures that would
be predicted by this account. In particular, the critical interaction
of ISI with condition remained significant even when control-
ling for response lures [F(1, 21) = 7.84, p = 0.01]. The only effects
attributable to lures were an increase in RT in the RCR condi-
tion [F(1, 21) = 12.54, p = 0.002], and a slight elongation of RT
at short, relative to long ISIs across all conditions [F(1, 21) = 3.29,
p < 0.09], with no other effects approaching significance (all F’s
< 1.71, p’s> 0.2). Thus, the disproportionate benefit of ISI in the
ICR condition was not attributable to the effect of lures.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING MODEL FIT (BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT)
Having observed a differential benefit of ISI on performance in
the ICR condition in terms of RT, we next assessed whether trial-
to-trial variations in this condition’s RT would correlate with
model-based estimates of the predicted utility of the irrelevant
first item. To this end, we tested whether the speed with which
participants could respond correctly on ICR trials involving a
short ISI could be predicted as a linear function of the predicted
utility of the irrelevant item, PUirrel, scaled by the inverse utility
of the context:
RTICR Short ISI = B0 + B1PUirrel (1 − PUc) + ε (4)
The basic prediction underlying this model is that performance in
the short ISI condition is poor because of a higher effective WM
load caused by themaintenance of the irrelevant item. This higher
load will decrease more slowly in time for items with higher pre-
dicted utility, leading to a differential cost for those items on short
ISI trials (see Figure 3A). Figure 3B illustrates how predicted util-
ity and experienced utility of a lower-level item would change as a
function of various trial characteristics; as noted in Materials and
Methods, lower-level items are granted a experienced utility of 1
only if they would be maintained in WM upon presentation of
the final stimulus event, and they are uniquely associated with the
correct response.
The resulting trial-by-trial estimates of predicted utility
showed a reliably positive correlation with RT on the short ISI
trials (one sample t-test against zero: t(21) = 3.84, p = 0.001),
even though neither the sign nor significance of this relationship
was enforced by the model fitting procedure. In other words, RTs
on short ISI trials in the ICR condition were significantly longer
when the irrelevant item in memory had a higher expectation of
being associated with the correct response (i.e., predicted utility).
FIGURE 3 | Conceptual schematic of computational model (A),
trial-by-trial RL-like updating of utilities (B), and significant fits to
RT in the ICR condition as a function of ISI (C). (A) The key
conceptual assumption in our model is that the benefit of a longer
ISI to RT and accuracy in the ICR condition reflects a sluggish
reduction in effective WM load following the presentation of context,
but that this sluggishness is exacerbated for irrelevant items that
had a higher predicted utility. (B) Several examples illustrate how
predicted and experienced utilities for an example item (“ ”)
change across trials. In the first illustrated trial, is specified as
relevant by the context and is associated with the correct response,
therefore acquiring an experienced utility of 1; the predicted utility
on the following trial is updated by the resulting utility prediction
error, scaled by the learning rate (here, 0.09). On this second trial,
“ ” is specified as irrelevant (due to the context) but is still
associated with the correct response, and thus again acquires an
experienced utility of 1. This experience changes its predicted utility
for the third trial, where it is now associated with the incorrect
response, and acquires zero experienced utility. In the fourth trial,
is not eligible for experienced utility because it should not be
held within WM (the context had rendered it irrelevant), whereas in
the fifth and sixth trials, R is associated/not associated (respectively)
with the correct response and acquires utilities of 1/0, respectively.
(C) At the short ISI of the ICR condition, the predicted utility of
irrelevant items was positively correlated with RT (“irrelevant utility
cost”), whereas the predicted utility of the relevant items was
negatively correlated (“relevant utility benefit”). These effects were
diminished at the long ISI.
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Interestingly, this “irrelevant utility cost” on RT was comple-
mented by the nearly-equal and opposite “relevant utility benefit”
to RT, arising from the predicted utility of the final item in ICR
trials (one sample t-test against zero: t(21) = 2.97, p = 0.007). In
addition, similar but apparently diminished effects were observed
at the long ISI (t’s< 1.08, p’s> 0.29; Figure 3C).
TASK-BASED fMRI
Context vs. fixation
As a first step in assessing whether the unique behavioral effects
identified in the ICR condition might also be associated with
unique hemodynamic patterns, we first contrasted the BOLD
response to context in the ICR, RCI, and RCR conditions with fix-
ation. These contrasts yielded robust activity throughout a fron-
toparietal network (Figure 4). Consistent with prior work using
2nd order hierarchical rule tasks like this one, several regions
in this network were commonly activated across all three condi-
tions (black outlined regions of Figure 4), including intraparietal
sulcus, dorsal premotor (PMd) cortex in the right hemisphere
and numerous left prefrontal regions, including dorsal PMd,
pre-premotor (pre-PMd), and inferior frontal sulcus (IFS).
Task-based fMRI: contrasts of responses to context across
conditions
Direct comparisons of the BOLD response across conditions
revealed widespread increases in BOLD at the onset of context
in both the ICR and RCI conditions relative to the RCR con-
dition (Figure 5, red-yellow regions), including within the IFS,
FIGURE 4 | BOLD responses to context vs. fixation (red-yellow) and
common areas of recruitment (black outlines). Relative to fixation, each
of the three conditions elicited a reliable BOLD response across frontal,
parietal, and occipital cortex. Most significant frontal activation, whether
medial and lateral, was observed in the left hemisphere (voxelwise z > 2.3,
corrected to p < 0.05 via GRF).
pre-PMd, PMd, intraparietal sulcus, dorsomedial prefrontal cor-
tex, right anterior insula, and left inferior frontal gyrus. Several of
these regions were recruited across both the ICR and RCI condi-
tions more strongly than in the RCR condition (Figure 5, black
outlines), including right anterior insula, left IFS, pre-PMd, PMd
and bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Nonetheless, the only
significant difference observed in a direct contrast of the ICR and
RCI conditions was a small cluster of voxels in primary visual
cortex, which showed only a modest increase in recruitment dur-
ing the RCI than ICR condition. There were no indications of
an increased response during the ICR vs. RCI anywhere in fron-
toparietal or striatal areas, even at a liberal threshold (p < 0.05
uncorrected).
To assess whether any potential BOLD differences between
the ICR and RCI conditions might have been obscured by an
ill-fitting canonical hemodynamic response function, we utilized
FMRIB’s Linear Optimized Basis Sets (FLOBS; Woolrich et al.,
2004) to reconstruct the hemodynamic timecourse for each con-
dition in each of multiple ROIs taken from Figure 5. However,
in no case were significant differences observed between the ICR
and RCI conditions—not in terms of peak signal change, inte-
grated signal change, or time to peak. Instead, both the ICR and
RCI conditions evinced fairly similar timecourses across a variety
of regions.
Thus, we found a commonly observed frontoparietal control
network to be engaged during performance of the task. However,
this network only responded differentially to selective (RCI/ICR)
vs. global (RCR) updating conditions, and did not further dif-
fer within the selective conditions. Likewise, there were not other
regions of the brain that distinguished between these conditions.
FIGURE 5 | BOLD responses to selective vs. global context conditions
(red-yellow) and common areas of recruitment (black outlines).
Contrasts of RCI and ICR vs. RCR revealed reliable BOLD response across
frontal, parietal, and occipital cortex (voxelwise z > 2.3, corrected to
p < 0.05 via GRF). The reverse contrasts of RCR > ICR and RCR > RCI, and
the direct contrasts of ICR with RCI, failed to reach significance.
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Hence, in the present design, we did not find evidence of a unique
system supporting active removal from WM. Next we sought
to identify the source of the predicted utility effects on WM
reallocation.
Model-based fMRI: trial-by-trial predicted utility regressor
The above analyses indicate that while the ICR condition is
distinguishable from the other conditions behaviorally, the task-
induced BOLD response does not clearly differentiate the ICR
condition from the others. However, our computational model
offers an additional opportunity to distinguish these conditions,
because the same model fit to the behavioral experiment can be
applied to the sequence of trials experienced by those same sub-
jects in the fMRI experiment (see Materials and Methods). The
resulting trial-by-trial estimates of the predicted utility of the
items putatively residing in WM were used as parametric regres-
sors at the onset of the context events, to determine whether the
ICR condition might be distinguished from the others in terms of
the BOLD response to these fluctuations in predicted utility.
In a whole-brain analysis, fluctuations in predicted utility reli-
ably predicted BOLD decreases in the RCI condition (Figure 6A),
differentially so relative to the ICR condition (Figure 6B), in parts
of dorsal PMd cortex, anterior intraparietal sulcus, and visual
cortex. Similarly, fluctuations in predicted utility also reliably
predicted BOLD decreases in the RCR condition (Figure 6C),
again differentially so relative to the ICR condition (Figure 6D),
although the latter effect was limited largely to the visual cortex
and posterior cingulate. No regions were found to significantly
correlate with trial-by-trial fluctuations in the predicted utility of
information in WM in the ICR condition, relative to fixation. A
whole-brain contrast of the ICR vs. the other conditions yielded
differences not only in visual cortex and posterior cingulate, in
line with the above contrasts, but also the left hippocampus and
bilateral ventral striatum (Figure 7A).
We further interrogated these effects by focusing our analysis
on the basal ganglia. Small-volume correction revealed a positive
correlation of left ventral striatum with trial-by-trial fluctuations
in the predicted utility of the preceding item in the ICR condi-
tion alone (Figure 7B). In bilateral ventral striatum, this positive
correlation during the ICR condition was reliably stronger than
that observed in both the RCI (Figure 7C) and RCR (Figure 7D)
conditions. By contrast, no significant correlation was observed in
either the RCI or RCR conditions in these small-volume corrected
analyses.
DISCUSSION
Here we provide evidence that the allocation of WM resources
is influenced by the predicted utility of to-be-remembered items,
and we implicate the ventral striatum in coding this historical
utility during the reallocation process. Specifically, WM task
performance was disproportionately impaired at short latencies
after the presentation of a disambiguating context, if that con-
text specified a preceding item as irrelevant for an upcoming
response. This impairment scaled with the historical utility of
these putatively-irrelevant items. A greater frontoparietal BOLD
response was elicited by larger changes in predicted utility (i.e.,
the RCI and ICR conditions) than smaller changes (the RCR
condition), but neither its amplitude nor shape depended the
sign of the change [whether positive (RCI) or negative (ICR)].
Further, in dorsal PMd cortex, anterior intraparietal sulcus, pos-
terior cingulate, and visual cortex, BOLD negatively correlated
with trial-by-trial fluctuations in the predicted utility of items that
should continue to be maintained. BOLD in the ventral striatum,
by contrast, positively correlated with trial-by-trial fluctuations
FIGURE 6 | BOLD correlates of model-based Predicted Utility estimates.
In the RCI condition, trials associated with lower predicted utility at the
presentation of context elicited a reliably stronger BOLD response in visual
cortex, anterior intraparietal sulcus, and a region of dorsal premotor cortex,
both relative to fixation (A) and relative to the ICR condition (B). A similar
effect was observed in scattered sections of the prefrontal cortex for the
RCR condition, including left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, left dorsal
premotor cortex, and ventral prefrontal cortex (C), although only activation in
the occipital lobe differentiated these effects of RCR from the ICR condition
(D). Voxelwise z > 2.3, corrected to p < 0.05 via GRF.
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FIGURE 7 | Ventral striatal BOLD positively and differentially correlates
with the predicted utility of items in WM in the ICR condition. (A)
Relative to all other conditions, bilateral ventral striatum was more strongly
correlated with the predicted utility of items in WM in the ICR condition. (B)
After restricting our analyzed volume to the basal ganglia (all other regions
masked), left ventral striatum was found to show a positive correlation with
the predicted utility of items in WM in the ICR condition. No other condition
showed this effect, and indeed bilateral ventral striatum was more positively
correlated with predicted utility in the ICR condition than either the RCI (C) or
RCR (D) conditions alone. Note that (B–D) mask out activity outside of the
basal ganglia (including caudate, nucleus accumbens, pallidum, and
putamen). Voxelwise z > 2.3, corrected to p < 0.05 via GRF.
in the predicted utility of items that were previously relevant but
should no longer be maintained.
These results are consistent with proposals that frontal cortex
and striatum dissociably support WM maintenance vs. updat-
ing, respectively (e.g., Barch et al., 1997; Fukai, 1999; Frank
et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001). By these accounts, recur-
rent networks of cells in lateral frontal cortex support robust
maintenance of items in WM (e.g., Durstewitz et al., 2000; Sakai
et al., 2002). Here, dorsal PMd activity correlated with items’
predicted utility only in contexts requiring the continued main-
tenance of these items (i.e., the RCI and RCR conditions). Thus,
not only is lateral frontal cortex engaged by contexts that require
continued maintenance, but this maintenance-related activity is
modulated by the utility of the items. In contrast, striatum has
been hypothesized to support an updating or a “gating” function
for updating WM via thalamo-cortical disinhibition (Frank et al.,
2001). Consistent with this gating function, striatum correlated
with the predicted utility of items only in contexts specifying
that WM resources should be allocated away from a previously-
maintained item. Thus, whereas utility modulated PFC activation
under conditions requiring maintenance, utility modulated stri-
atal activation under conditions requiring gating. However, the
“gating” response observed here is not evoking the selection of a
new item to put in WM, in any obvious way. Rather, this utility-
driven response in striatum is involved in a reallocation process,
such as selecting a plan to update an upcoming item, dropping
the active maintenance of an item in memory, deprioritizing this
item, or perhaps even actively removing the obsolete item. We
return to the question of mechanism below.
The modulation of distinct frontal WM maintenance vs. stri-
atal gating functions by predicted utility could parallel the dis-
tinct actions of dopamine on frontal vs. basal ganglia systems
(Durstewitz et al., 2000; Cools, 2008). Specifically, evidence from
animals and humans has suggested that dopamine enhances
“stability” in frontal cortex, makingWMmaintenancemore resis-
tant to distraction. By contrast, increased dopamine in striatum
enhances “flexibility,” facilitating switching to new responses or
courses of action as circumstances demand. Similar to the fron-
tostriatal correlates of predicted utility reported above, distinct
BOLD changes have been evoked in PFC vs. maintenance vs. task
switching, respectively, by dopamine agonists (e.g., bromocrip-
tine; Cools et al., 2007). If the encoding of expected value by
dopaminergic projections to striatum and PFC also encodes
the historical value of items in WM (Frank et al., 2001), then
dopaminemight mediate the frontostriatal correlates of predicted
utility observed here. This hypothesis makes clear predictions for
the effects of dopaminergic drugs on this task.
Pharmacological tests might also help establish the causality
among the frontostriatal mechanisms we implicate in encoding
predicted utility. For example, ventral striatal activity might cor-
relate with predicted utility in the ICR condition because that
region is causally responsible for the sluggishness with which
items can be removed fromWM. By this account, ventral striatum
might either enact reallocation, or conversely “veto” reallocation,
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whenever predicted utility of the putatively irrelevant informa-
tion remains relatively high. There is some recent support for the
latter possibility: direct electrical stimulation of the ventral stria-
tum preserves the maintenance of action plans that are no longer
necessary to receive a reward (Jurado-Parras et al., 2012), as might
be expected if ventral striatum serves to delay or veto WM reallo-
cation. However, future genetic, patient, and/or pharmacological
interventions targeting dopaminergic action more directly will be
required to confirm the role of dopamine in supporting the utility
based reallocation and maintenance functions identified here.
Interestingly, the frontal correlates of predicted utility as
observed in the RCI and RCR conditions were significant in
a fairly caudal sector of dorsal PMd cortex (see Figure 5). No
correlations with predicted utility were observed in the ICR con-
dition within these dorsal PMd regions, even at extremely liberal
thresholds (p < 0.05, uncorrected). Likewise, little correlation
with predicted utility within the RCI condition was observed
in the more immediately rostral frontal cortex (p < 0.05 uncor-
rected), though regions like pre-PMd and IFS were activated by
the contrast of RCI/ICR vs. RCR. Hence, the apparent focality of
the RCI/RCR correlation diverges from the much wider-spread
results of our task-based contrast across conditions (see Figure 4).
Such divergence might suggest that the utility of more concrete
or lower-level items is particularly demanding on caudal frontal
substrates. This possibility is intriguing in light of prior work sug-
gesting systematic rostral vs. caudal differences in lateral frontal
cortex as increasingly abstract rules and contexts are used to gov-
ern action (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre and D’Esposito, 2007; Nee
and Brown, 2012; Reynolds et al., 2012; Nee et al., 2013). This
prior work has identified a PMd region, partially overlapping with
the present focus, as particularly important for control according
to simple rules that directly map a stimulus to a response. Thus,
in the present task, it is striking that utility for the lower-level item
appears to be tracked in this PMd region for conditions when
the lower level items must be maintained as a direct context for
response selection. Nevertheless, future work manipulating addi-
tional levels of abstraction would be required to assess whether
the locus of effect here is due to the level of representation
being maintained, and to provide the necessary region by effect
interactions that would support such functional specificity.
Future work should also confront the potentially important
relationship between utility and demands on selective attention.
Notably, the simple difference in BOLD between the RCR and
other conditions throughout frontoparietal cortex might reflect
both selective attention (i.e., both ICR and RCI involve selec-
tively attending to one particular class of lower-level items) as well
as utility-based WM reallocation. However, the distinct correla-
tions with utility observed between the ICR and other conditions
suggest that, at a minimum, selective attention and utility inter-
act; a conception of selective attention that would not be unlike
the WM and gating functions we propose here. Future work
should test whether selective attention can be engaged in a way
that is truly independent of predicted utility, or whether they are
causally related (e.g., predicted utility might set the selectivity of
attention).
One alternative interpretation of our behavioral results is that
the differential behavioral benefit of ISI reflects the compulsory
closure of an input gate following the presentation of context in
the ICR condition. We find this a dissatisfying explanation for the
complete pattern of results for several reasons. First, gate closure
would not be helpful in the ICR condition (where the next item
is deterministically relevant). Second, it’s unclear why gate clo-
sure would occur differentially in ICR condition relative to the
RCI condition, where the next item is deterministically irrelevant
and so gate closure would be helpful. Third, it’s unclear why gate
closure would be differentially related to predicted utility in the
ICR condition relative to the other conditions, particularly the
RCI condition. And, finally, it’s unclear why the timecourse of this
effect should be so much slower than other phenomena poten-
tially arising from the compulsory closing of an input gate (e.g.,
the attentional blink; Olivers and Meeter, 2008).
A related factor that may interact with utility, and WM real-
location, is time. WM representations with temporally-delayed
utility should undergo some discounting, so as to avoid oppor-
tunity costs: WM might otherwise remain occupied with items
that are hugely useful but only for some distant opportunity.
Discounting could help reallocate WM in these situations, so as
to represent information of value in the nearer term. One sim-
ple mechanism would be to impose a minimum threshold on
the utility of information that is to be maintained. Alternatively,
more sophisticated discounting functions might be applied to the
contents of WM. Future work should attempt to distinguish the
functional form relating predicted utility to time, behavior and
the consumption of WM resources.
As alluded to above, our work does not address the
important—but distinct—question of what mechanism supports
WM reallocation. Instead, we use the term “reallocation” more
broadly, to refer a goal of the WM system that could be accom-
plished in many ways. For example, WM reallocation could occur
through the indirect removal of non-utile items (e.g., via their
decay or “sudden death”; Zhang and Luck, 2009) or through
their indirect overwriting (e.g., via interference). Alternatively,
WM reallocation could occur through more “direct” or targeted
removal (e.g., via the deletion or clearing of a non-utile WM
representation) or more targeted overwrite (e.g., via updating a
specific non-utile representation with information that is more
utile). WM reallocation could also occur through deprioritiza-
tion, such as by shifting a capacity-limited “focus of attention”
(Oberauer et al., 2012), or by closing an “output gate” to pro-
hibit the influence of this maintained item on action (Chatham
et al., under review). Of note, extant models of WM reallocation
span this gamut of mutually-compatible possibilities, suggesting
that all could be plausible mechanisms supporting this func-
tion (Hazy et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Oberauer and
Lewandowsky, 2011; Oberauer et al., 2012).
Our study was not designed to distinguish among these alter-
native mechanisms. Nevertheless, there is at least one finding in
this study that might be informative for future directed experi-
ments and theory. Of note, we failed to locate a region that was
differentially activated between the ICR and RCI conditions. This
is perhaps surprising from the perspective of a targeted removal
or deletion process, as one might have predicted that such a pro-
cess would be associated with differential activation during the
sole condition demanding removal (i.e., ICR). However, as this is
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a null result, we also cannot conclusively rule out the existence of
targeted removal process from the present results.
A more direct implication of our model and data is that WM
resources can be strategically reallocated in a way that correlates
with basic RL principles. Trial-by-trial fluctuations in perfor-
mance and frontoparietal and striatal BOLD can be predicted
by a reinforcement learner tracking the utility of information
in WM. These correlations suggest that RL might play a role
not only in controlling the input to WM, but also in deter-
mining whether information should undergo continued mainte-
nance. Such findings oblige theoretical models of WM to account
for potential interactions with RL systems capable of tracking
utility.
Relatedly, our results highlight a potential confound between
WM load and predicted utility in standard WM paradigms.
For example, predicted utility and WM load are often either
intrinsically collinear (as in change detection and partial report
procedures) or could be perceived as such (e.g., if a correct
response requires N bits of maintained information, each bit
might be associated with a utility of 1/N). Some effects thought to
reflect WM load effects could actually arise from these differences
in utility. Tasks where load and predicted utility are somewhat
more orthogonal (e.g., n-back) might clarify this issue, but also
involve numerous and oppositely-signed changes in utility of the
information in WM at every trial. For this reason, future work
may requiremodels of the kind presented here in order to separate
these demands.
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